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Free Trade Agreements and their impact on Latin
American migrations: An approach
Ricardo E. Buitrago R.*

Abstract

Tratados

de

Libre Comercio

y su impacto en migraciones
This paper aims to review the causes of international
migration and the potential impact of FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) on Latin American Migrations. The

Latinoamericanas: Un Enfoque

Resumen

first part describes the economic and non-economic
causes for migration. The second one shows the po-

Este artículo pretende hacer una revisión de las cau-

tential impact of FTAs in the economy (job creation/

sas de la migración internacional y el potencial im-

destruction by sectors) in CAFTA countries and Co-

pacto de los Tratados de Libre Comercio (TLC) en las

lombia. The last part shows that there is little corre-

migraciones Latinoamericanas. La primera parte del

lation between the commercial openness (FTAs) and

artículo describe las causas económicas y no econó-

the reduction of poverty. Poverty seems to be increa-

micas de las migraciones. La segunda parte mues-

sing in the studied countries –even more in those

tra el impacto potencial de los TLC en la economía

with the most open commercial regimens, than in

(creación/destrucción de empleos por sectores) de

those with the most closed ones. Data proves that

los países del CAFTA y en Colombia; y en la tercera

openness doesn’t reduce the poverty automatically;

se evidencia la poca correlación que existe entre la

on the contrary, in some (regional or subregional) ca-

apertura comercial y la reducción de la pobreza. La

ses it increases and causes a major determinant of in-

pobreza parece estar incrementándose en los países

ternational migration in Latin American countries.

analizados, aún más en aquellos con regímenes más
abiertos. Los datos demuestran que la apertura no re-

Key words: Economic Growth, Free Trade Agree-

duce la pobreza automáticamente, por el contrario,

ments, Trade Openness, Migration, Poverty.

en algunos casos (regionales o subrregionales) ésta se
incrementa causando así un determinante importante frente al proceso migratorio en América Latina.
Palabras clave: crecimiento económico, Tratados
de Libre Comercio, apertura comercial, migración,
pobreza.
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Introduction

Causes

of international
migration

International migration is currently arousing a wide
range of concerns in the countries of the Americas,

International migration is usually a major -and

yet responses until recently have tended to be unila-

highly considered- individual or family decision.

teral and administrative, and disconnected from so-

In Latin America, crossing national borders to settle

cial and economic development goals in the widest

or work in another country is not a decision made

sense. There is a need for better understanding of mi-

lightly. There are two broad categories of migrants:

gration, in order to channel it effectively in today’s

those who migrate to another country primarily for

changing world; and this requires a comprehensive

economic reasons, and those who move primarily for

approach involving all stakeholders, in order to ab-

non-economic reasons. The economic reasons might

sorb the acute tensions that are being generated as

include labor recruitment (guest workers), unemplo-

we move into the twenty-first century.

yment, underemployment and low wages. The noneconomic reason might include family unification,

Dealing with the repercussions of international migra-

war, persecution, displacement, refuge and asylum.

tion is indissolubly linked to the struggle for social
equity, so including this in actions to reduce poverty

¿What

explains migration in

Colombia?

and inequality in employment and social security, and
in the domain of social assistance, involves the entire

The Colombian census in 2005 answered the ques-

population of the region, regardless of origin or natio-

tion of the number of Colombians living abroad at the

nality. Some Latin American countries expect, trough

time: ca. 3,3 million; 8% of population. An important

free trade agreements, to reach that social equity.

finding of the census is geographical distribution of
Colombian migration (see Chart 1). The three main

International flows of workers, cultural interaction, ac-

destinations are the United States (35,4%), Spain

ceptance of people displaced from their own countries

(23,3%) and Venezuela (18,5%); followed by Ecua-

– these are facts of life in each of the nations of the

dor, Canada, Panama and Mexico. It is possible that

region, extending throughout the American continent.

in some European countries as the UK, Italy and the

Although lack of data makes it impossible to calculate

Netherlands reside a bigger number of Colombians

the exact number of people participating in the various

than in Bolivia, Peru or Argentina. This is owed,

migratory flows, their size is the most visible expres-

partly, to the economic crisis of the eighties that stor-

sion of international migration in the continent.

med the countries across the region and made them
less attractive for intra-regional migration.

This document reviews some data and facts on selected countries in Latin America (DR-CAFTA and Co-

On the other hand, the demand of cheap manpower

lombia), correlate them and aims to explain the causes

has increased in the industrialized countries, what

for international migration and the potential impacts

attracts more emigrants from developing countries.

of free trade agreements on that migration. The final

Also, technological progress1 in transportation have

purpose is to give an approach of one of the major pro-

reduced displacement costs and time traveling, faci-

blems that affects some countries in the region.

litating migration.

1

A change in a production function that alters the relationship between inputs and outputs. It is normally understood to be an improvement in
technology, and it is of interest in international economics for its implications for trade and economic welfare.
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Chart 1. Main Destinations

of

Colombian
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rate begins to lower.

migrants
2% 1% 1% 1% 1%

The second analysis includes some structural variables, as rural population, education level, social

14%
35%
19%

expenditure, the Gini coefficient and poverty level.
Rural population’s coefficient is negative and signifi-

23%

cant at the 1% level. This result coincides with those
of other studies (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). In
USA

Spain

Venezuela

Others

Ecuador

Canada

Pánama

México

Source: author based on DANE, 2005.

Factors

fact, the migratory process is first a movement to cities before being to foreign countries.
This behavior is related directly with education level. The more educated the population is, the more it

that influence migration in

Colombia
Traditional analysis of the determinants of migration
distinguishes between push factors and pull factors,
since the possible migrants consider both the conditions of their country of origin and those of the receiving country. Todaro’s model (1969) highlights the
differential of wages and the employment conditions
in both countries. However, in the case of the determinants of emigration in Colombia only push factors
are taken into account, e.g. the country’s internal
conditions. Ergo the assumption that the situation in
the receiving countries is identical for migrants.
As shown in Khoudour-Casteras (2005), the first
analysis (for all the analysis the dependent variable is migration) only includes the GDP per capita
as a driver for migration. The coefficient is negative but not significant, indicating that the migration
rate doesn’t depend on the low income level. In fact,
certain level of income is needed to travel to another country. It means that however they want it, the
poorest cannot leave the country. On the contrary,
when income starts going up, regions with high poverty level register an increment in the emigration
levels, since their habitants have enough revenues
for migration. Then, when the income level is high

tends to migrate to other countries, as confirmed by the
schooling coefficient: positive and significant at the
10% level. Indeed, in society exists a process of positive selection (Borjas, 1987), that means, people with
higher education level has higher migration possibilities. The most qualified are prepared to face the challenges of the migration, as leaving their environment
and living in a country with a different culture and language. On the other hand, in a context of increasingly
restrictive migratory policies, it is easier for a qualified
worker than for a not qualified person to obtain a visa
for work or study in an industrialized country.
Social expenditure coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level. This is due to the fact that
social expenditure is a kind of indirect wage that
complements the remuneration of the worker. When
population receives benefits from a social protection
system, the pressure for migration is smaller (Bogotá,
Atlántico). In fact, many emigrants justify its decision
not only on the higher wages in other countries, but
also on the education opportunities for them or their
children. Accordingly, Colombian departments that
invest more in education and health present smaller
levels of migration (Khoudour-Casteras, 2005).
On the other hand, the results of the Gini coefficient
can be surprising at first sight; the coefficient is ne-
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gative and significant at the 10% level. It would be

partly by the coffee crisis in the middle of nineties.

expected that more inequality would produced big-

On the other hand, the departments with the lowest

ger relative “frustration” and a bigger migration rate.

unemployment rates have lower migration rates than

Indeed, in a society with limited social mobility,

the national average (Sucre, Caquetá).

people that are in the base look for better opportunities in other countries to climb socially (Stark, Taylor

The fifth and final analysis includes two explanatory

and Yitzhaki, 1988). However, the negative relation-

variables related with violence: the rate of homicides

ship between inequality and emigration is explained

and the number of attacks. The homicides coefficient

because poorest people don’t have enough resources

is positive and significant at the 5% level, while the

to go to foreign countries; and the richest don’t have

attacks coefficient is negative and significant at the

to migrate to improve their situation. Certainly, the

1% level. Although both variables are related with

Colombian departments with the highest concentra-

violence, they refer to two different realities, which

tion of revenues (Antioquia, Boyacá, Huila) register

explains why their impact on the migration is oppo-

the lowest emigration rates (Ibid).

sed. The deterioration of the conditions of life and
the increment of protection costs explain the rela-

This result is coherent with those found in Clark,

tionship among homicides and migration: migration

Hatton and Williamson (2003). The negative rela-

is a form of being protected against the violence.

tionship between Gini coefficient and the migration

Attacks, on the other hand, are an indicator of the

rate seems to contradict the previous result: bigger

armed conflict. Although the conflict is translated to

social expenditure, smaller migration. Actually, the

population movements, these are usually collective

correlation coefficient between social expenditure

and constitute a forced displacement to other areas

per capita and Gini coefficient it is not high (0,10).

of the Colombian territory. This explains the inverse

This means that social investment is not guided to

relationship among attacks and emigration. It is not

the poorest. Therefore, the expenses in superior edu-

that people are not affected by the conflict but rather

cation benefit above all those who have possibility to

that they migrate to other departments, in particular

go to the university, it means, people that belong at

to those that register smaller indexes of violence and

least to middle class.

present a more attractive economic situation.

The fourth analysis includes economic growth and

Factors

unemployment. These two variables have prospecti-

DRCAFTA2 Countries

influencing migration from

ve signs and they don’t affect negatively other variables. While the economic growth coefficient negati-

It is important to relate the escalation of migrations

ve, unemployment is positive. Both are significant at

in the region with the economic, social and political

the 5% level. This means that, when the economic

events that have taken place in the last decades both

situation deteriorates (recession and further unem-

at national and international level. In the first plane,

ployment), there are supplementary incentives to

it is obvious the relationship of cause and effect in the

migrate. On the contrary, an improvement of the

successive failures of the impelled development mo-

economic activity reduces the manpower migration.

dels in the region. Basically, Central America has the

The high emigration levels of coffee growing de-

same drivers of Colombia for international migration,

partments (Caldas, Quindío, Risaralda) is explained

the analysis of each country is shown in Table 1.

2

DR – CAFTA: Dominican Republic and Central America Free Trade Agreement.
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Table 1. Explaining Deviations

from the

Average Central America – Caribbean Immigration Rate

United States, 1971-1998 (Contribution
Barbados

Dom. Rep.

Jamaica

Log immig rate

280.7

179.3

GDP per capita

-42

22

16.4

Schoolling

30

-11.6

Inequality

5

6.4

Age 15-29

2.5

Immig stock

to the deviation in the log immigration rate

Trinidad

Guatemala Honduras

Nicaragua

Panamá

-16.9

114.4

8.4

34.1

37.6

64.3

-80.6

2.3

25.4

20.4

34.4

27.3

6.1

-8.9

15.2

0.9

-15.4

-25.4

-16.7

-17.4

14.9

-6.1

-3.8

4.3

5.3

2.4

-10.6

4.4

3.2

4.2

-0.9

4

5.6

-0.4

-4

-1.6

-1.1

1.6

27

11.1

29.2

14.5

-4.9

11.6

-2.9

-2.8

3.3

6.7

Distance

20.7

46.7

53.1

17.8

35.7

46

48.1

47.1

41.9

31.8

Landlicked

4.7

4.7

4.7

4.7

4.7

4.7

4.7

4.7

4.7

4.7

164.5

-36.5

-36.5

-36.5

-36.5

-36.5

-36.5

-36.5

-1.1

-1.1

-1.1

4.4

2.4

-1.1

3.2

-1.1

English
Civil war

253.5 201.8

Costa Rica El Salvador

to the

× 100)

164.5 164.5
-1.1

-1.1

Source: author, based on Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2003).

On the other hand, non-economic factors that increa-

duce corn, and send it to U.S. in exchange for cars.

se migrations converge at least in three facts:

This way, the Americans have lower food costs, and

The loss of the population’s trust in the States and

the Colombians have cheaper cars. With trade acce-

the policymakers, as well as in their interest to revert

lerating economic and job growth in both countries,

that situation.

there is less Colombian emigration.

Important force of migrants change expressed in the

In theory, economically motivated migration should

search of new solution options.

decrease in a free trade world because of factor price

Existence of a labor market outside of the country

convergence, the tendency of wages to converge as

that demands the manpower of the region.

workers move from poorer to richer countries (when
people mobility is not restricted). In terms of econo-

International Trade, FDI

and migration

mic theory, this means that trade and migration are
substitutes – countries that have relatively cheaper

Economic theory suggests that, if countries specia-

labour can export labour-intensive goods or workers.

lize in producing those goods in which the country

Over time, differences in the prices of goods and the

has a comparative or competitive advantage, the re-

wages of workers should converge with freer trade,

sidents of all countries that trade or exchange goods

reducing emigration pressures.

will be better off. Trade affects the location and cost
of producing goods. Trade policies affect the compe-

The US Commission for the Study of International

titiveness of a country’s products, and employment

Migration and Cooperative Economic Development

in the export and import sectors of both sending and

searched for the best mutually beneficial way to re-

receiving countries. This means that if Colombia

duce unwanted migration, and concluded that “ex-

can produce agricultural commodities cheaper than

panded trade between the sending countries and the

United States, and United States can produce cars

United States is the single most important remedy”

cheaper than Colombia then Colombia should pro-

(1990: xv).

Free Trade Agreements and their impact on Latin American migrations: An approach / 11
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Many countries have embraced freer trade as a route

FDI may serve as production platforms, attracting

to faster economic growth. In 2007, estimated trade in

FDI because they are stable economically and poli-

goods and services was worth $16 trillion, almost 31%

tically, and then permitting the entry of foreign wor-

of the world’s GDP (Dadush and Nielson, 2007). As

kers to staff the factories. Third, FDI may increase

trade continues to expand, economic growth should

internal migration and emigration. Much of the FDI

speed up, and in the long run trade in goods should

in developing countries goes into free-trade zones,

replace the migration of people. However, when

which often have foreign owned assembly (maquila)

countries with weak economies and structural com-

plants that import components and turn them into

petitiveness problems suddenly embrace freer trade,

consumer goods to be exported. As farmers and other

there can be severe adjustments. Agriculture in Latin

workers are displaced in the interior of the country,

America and the Caribbean employs 30% of the labor

they may migrate to seek jobs in border-area Free

force and generates 7% of GDP growth, and opening

Trade Zones. Those not hired may emigrate, as they

a developing country agriculture to freer trade may

come into contact with the international migration

displace farmers; and the displaced farmers, often un-

infrastructure in more dynamic economic areas.

skilled men, may not be able to find factory jobs and
some may migrate abroad for jobs. The US Commis-

But in Latin America, FDI promotes income inequa-

sion warned that “the economic development process

lity. Income inequality is persistently and relatively

itself tends in the short to medium term to stimulate

high in almost all Latin American countries. Labour

migration”, the so-called migration hump (1990: xvi).

income inequality plays an important role in total
income inequality. Income inequality can be deter-

The migration hump can be smaller and shorter li-

mined by at least three factors: the distribution of

ved if immigrating and emigrating countries coope-

factors of production, the demand for those factors,

rate to accelerate the pace of job creation in emigra-

and the supply.

tion countries. For example, instead of emigrating,
displaced farmers may not emigrate if foreign inves-

While FDI may have been good for development (e.g.

tment creates jobs for them near their homes. The-

there are positive correlations between FDI and GDP,

re are many types of investments, but foreign direct

productivity, and wages) this masks the fact that di-

investment (FDI) oriented to factories and other job-

fferent countries with different policies and econo-

creating workplaces is most likely to spur economic

mic factors tend to derive different benefits and costs

and productivity growth and reduce emigration. FDI

of FDI. In addition, not all types of workers necessa-

flows to countries where entrepreneurs think they

rily gain from FDI to the same extent. The reasons for

are most likely to make profits, not necessarily to

this include: FDI induces skill-specific technological

emigration areas most in need of jobs.

change; it can be associated with skill-specific wage
bargaining; it may locate in skill-intensive sectors;

The same FDI that increases jobs and trade, and

and it provides more training to skilled than unski-

reduces migration in the long term, may increa-

lled workers. A review of micro and macro evidence

se migration in the short term. Three examples are

shows that, at a minimum, FDI is likely to perpetuate

illustrative. First, foreigners investing in developing

inequalities. This is in contrast to what traditional

countries usually send managers and their professio-

trade and FDI theories would predict.

nals to help operate the factory, which means that
FDI is often marked by more migration of professio-

There is no doubt that the economies of Latin Ame-

nal expatriates. Second, some countries receiving

rica and the Caribbean have benefited from FDI (see

12 / Ricardo E. Buitrago R.
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Chart 2), but they have not done so in the same pro-

produced the benefits expected from inward FDI or

portion as other regions in which optimizing the im-

have not done so to the desired degree (Mortimore,

pacts of FDI is a conscious policy concern. Passive

2006).

policies in this matter in the region have either not
Chart 2. Latin

america and the caribbean: net fdi inflows,

1992-2006 a (millions

of dollars)

60000
50000
40000
30000

USD Millions

20000
10000
0
-10000

1992-1996 b 1997-2001 b 2002-2006 b
c
1. México
4. South America: subtotal
Brazil

2005

2. Central America and Panama
Argentina
Chile

2006 c
3. Caribbean
Bolivia
Colombia

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates.

a. Excludes investment received by the main finan-

An example demonstrates this situation. It is well

cial centres. Net FDI inflows are defined as FDI

known that efficiency-seeking FDI can potentially

inflows to the reporting economy minus capital

produce concrete benefits with regard to technology

outflows generated by foreign companies. These

transfer, production linkages, human resource trai-

FDI figures differ from those published by ECLAC

ning and enterprise development (UNCTAD, 2002),

in the Economic Survey of Latin America and the

although it is recognized that those benefits are far

Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the

from automatic. In Latin America and the Caribbean,

Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean

passive policies based on horizontal incentives (es-

because, in those studies, FDI is defined as net

pecially tax exemptions in export processing zones)

inflows to the reporting economy minus net

have not effectively integrated investment activities

outflows generated by residents.

into the local industry in any of the areas examined

b. Annual averages.

(Mortimore, 2004, 2006). The result is enclave-like

c. Data were not available, as of 24 April 2007, for

operations that produce impressive export earnings

FDI inflows to several Caribbean countries for

but do not contribute in any fundamental way to the

2006. The estimates presented here for 2006 are

continual technological and industrial upgrading of

based on annual averages for 2001-2005.

the host economy (UNCTAD, 2002; Mortimore, Vergara and Katz, 2001; ECLAC, 2005, 2006a).
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Free

trade agreements (ftas)
and their impact on the
economy

countries that engage in regional integration arran-

From a theoretical perspective, the welfare gains

commodities only) have much less to gain from inte-

from trade liberalization and FTAs are not obvious.

gration than countries that can specialize in a broader

In the standard approach of the old trade theory,

range of commodities. Under such conditions, forms

the adapted Viner-Meade version of the Heckscher-

of south-south integration may not be beneficial for

Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework applied to trade

poorer countries as it may draw, for instance, much

liberalization, three effects are seen to determine the

of manufacturing production to the already more de-

aggregate welfare outcomes of FTAs: (i) “trade crea-

veloped and diversified economy that is part of the

tion” as a result of changes in commodity trade in the

agreement. For such agreements to work out more

countries within the agreement; (ii) “trade diversion”

equitably among its members, trade integration mea-

caused by changes in trade between the FTA coun-

sures would have to be complemented with industry

tries and the rest of the world; and (iii) “terms-of-

and other production sector development policies to

trade” effects triggered by changes in international

strengthen economic integration at the national level.

gements considered. Venables (2003), for instance,
argues that countries with what he calls “extreme”
comparative advantage (that is, specialization in few

prices facing the countries (Vos, 2007).
FTAs are often seen as vehicles to introduce additioTrade creation and terms-of-trade gains are in gene-

nal reforms that make the investment environment

ral welfare-enhancing for countries within a customs

more appealing to attract FDI from developed coun-

union, whereas trade diversion and terms-of-trade

tries through which there may potentially be a trans-

losses are potentially damaging to countries outside

fer of global technology and increased productivity.

the union. This turns the question whether an FTA

Waldkirch (2006) shows that foreign investment is

is welfare-increasing into an empirical one. From

also subject to sovereign risk and FTAs may serve as

their comprehensive review of theory and empirical

a commitment mechanism in order to achieve higher

literature on regional trade agreements, Burfisher et

sustainable levels of FDI. Raff (2004) even argues that

al., (2001) draw two, what they consider to be robust

FTAs affect the location of FDI since governments

conclusions regarding the lessons learned from the

may adjust taxes and external tariff s to compete for

empirical work in the Viner-Meade framework. First,

FDI – whether this raises or lowers welfare is shown

such agreements are generally good for the member

to depend on the relative size of the efficiency gain

countries and not seriously detrimental to non-mem-

from integration and the revenue loss associated

bers, but global (multilateral) liberalization would

with tax competition. These findings reiterate the

always be better. Second, the potential benefits of

point that the welfare gains from trade and attraction

trade liberalization in general and regional FTAs in

of FDI through FTAs are context-specific, as well as

particular, tend to be rather small as shares of na-

that the gains are likely stronger for economies that

tional product. The latter is due in part because the

already have more integrated domestic economies to

HOS framework does not take into account dynamic

begin with.

factors beyond the efficiency gains from reallocating
resources according to comparative advantage.

Some facts from NAFTA show FDI in Mexico have
resulted in the destruction of jobs in agricultural

Even these findings need to be treated with some

activities and small and medium sized companies,

caution however, and the economic structures of the

the exclusion of the traditional economic sectors

14 / Ricardo E. Buitrago R.
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(see Chart 3), leaving the country without sectors

well remunerated). International migration, through

which arise economic relief and give dynamism to

the remittances to Mexican households, has become

the national economies and generate the employ-

fundamental for the maintenance of internal market,

ments required by the population (permanent and

of the fragile macroeconomic balances and of the
relative social stability (See Chart 4).

Chart 3. Employment

in

Mexico 1960 - 2004
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Source: Puyana, 2007.

Chart 4. Mexico – Contribution

of

Exports

in

Job Creation 1965 - 2005
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On the other hand, the work of Sandra Polaski (2003)

can peso crisis of 1994-1995. However, during the

evidenced that the job creation and income now are

NAFTA period, productivity growth has not trans-

lower than in 1993 when NAFTA took effect, as she

lated into wage growth, as it did in earlier periods

explains “Real wages for many Mexicans today are

in Mexico. Mexican wages are also diverging from,

lower than when NAFTA took effect. The stunning

rather than converging with, U.S. wages. Income in-

setback in wages is mainly attributable to the Mexi-

equality has been on the rise in Mexico since NAFTA
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took effect, reversing a brief declining trend in the

percent have lost income share or seen no change.

early 1990s. Compared to the period before NAFTA,

Regional inequality within Mexico has also increa-

the top 10 percent of households have increased

sed, reversing a long-term trend toward convergence

their share of national income, while the other 90

in regional incomes” (See Table 2).

Table 2. Real Income

by

Household Mexico 1993 – 2005

Quarterly monetary real income by household

Quarterly monetary real income by household

NATIONAL

RURAL AREAS

1993

2005

Mx Pesos of 1993

Chnage
2005/1993

1993

(-)

2005

Mx Pesos of 1993

Total

8,097.58

5,986.02

26.08%

Total

I

1,255.94

657.00

47.69%

II

2,213.60

1,512.80

III

2,995.97

IV

Change
2005/1993
(-)

7565.8

5563.0

26.47%

I

1,213.48

634.10

47.75%

31.66%

II

2,177.46

1,506.50

30.81%

2,173.70

27.45%

III

2,991.76

2,164.50

27.65%

3,801.61

2,806.50

26.18%

IV

3,769.10

2,811.40

25.41%

V

4,646.58

3,502.80

24.62%

V

4,658.95

3,489.70

25.10%

VI

5,760.45

4,310.00

25.18%

VI

5,789.15

4,278.10

26.10%

VII

7,222.46

5,396.10

25.29%

VII

7,173.11

5,400.10

24.72%

VIII

9,210.22

7,003.10

23.96%

VIII

9,282.83

6,946.90

25.16%

IX

12,969.44

9,656.60

25.54%

IX

12,284.46

9,574.80

22.06%

X

30,899.48

22,841.60

26.08%

X

26,317.74

18,823.50

28.48%

Source: Puyana, 2007.

The

impact of

DR-CAFTA

Some proportion of households, perhaps as high as
19% in the case of El Salvador, would neither be-

The evidence indicates that 90% of Nicaraguan

nefit nor lose as a result of DR-CAFTA-related price

households, 84% of Guatemalan households, and

changes, due either to the fact that they neither con-

68% of Salvadorian households are net consumers

sume or produce the sensitive commodities, or that

of the basket of sensitive agricultural commodities

they consume and produce them in roughly equal

and, thus, on net, can be expected to benefit from

amounts.

the sum of the price changes expected to occur when
sensitive agricultural commodities are liberalized.

Country case studies (World Bank, 2005) indicate

Conversely, about 9% of Nicaraguan households,

a common pattern of likely “winners” and “losers”

16% of Guatemalan households, and 5% of Salva-

across the welfare distribution; specifically, a higher

dorian households are net producers of the basket of

percentage of the net consumers are expected to be-

sensitive commodities and would, thus, be expected

nefit and net producers are expected to loose. More

to experience (static) welfare losses arising from the

specifically, 90 percent of Nicaraguan households, 84

price changes induced by DR-CAFTA.

percent of Guatemalan households, and 68 percent of
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Salvadoran households, respectively, were found to be

households, and 5 percent of Salvadoran households

net consumers of the basket of sensitive agricultural

were found to be net producers of the basket of sen-

commodities who can be expected to benefit from DR-

sitive commodities and, thus, would be expected to

CAFTA-related price changes. Only about 9 percent

experience welfare losses (See Table 3).

of Nicaraguan households, 16 percent of Guatemalan
Table 3. Net

consumers and net producers of the basket of sensitive agricultural commodities

Selected

Countries CAFTA.

Country
Goup

NIcaragua

Guatemala

El Salvador

Net
consumers

Net
producers

Net
consumers

Net
producers

Net
consumers

Net
producers

Benefitts

Looses

Benefitts

Looses

Benefitts

Looses

All country

90.2

8.8

83.8

15.7

68.2

4.1

Rural

78.8

19.4

75.1

24.5

72.1

4.1

Urban

97.6

1.8

93.6

5.8

65.2

4.1

Source: World Bank, 2005.

While the vast majority of people in these three coun-

households in the poorest quintile could be as much

tries stand to gain from liberalization of the sensitive

as 3.4 percent of per capita income. As with patterns

agricultural commodities, the evidence suggests that

of net consumers and net producers, the actual size

the number of people who could be adversely affec-

of gains and losses that households experience will

ted by DR-CAFTA-related price changes is not trivial

be determined in important ways by local patterns

- at least in the absence of measures to mitigate those

of production and consumption (World Bank, 2005).

impacts. The proportion of net producers estimated

Impact

for each country implies, for example, that roughly

of us–colombia

FTA

260,000 (out of 6.5 million) Salvadorans, 484,000 (out
of 5.5 million) Nicaraguans, and 1.9 million (out of 12.3

Many authors use empirical and applied methods

million) Guatemalans would be negatively affected by

of economic analysis to examine the potential quan-

price effects of DR-CAFTA (World Bank, 2005).

titative impact of a US-Colombia FTA on bilateral
trade, economic welfare, and other major variables

The analysis also suggests that specific subgroups

for each of the two countries. Empirical analysis

face higher than average risks of experiencing ne-

involves application of the so-called gravity model

gative impacts of price changes in the absence of

(Cárdenas – Garcia, 2004), which investigates the

complementary policy measures. In Nicaragua, for

determinants of aggregate trade between countries

example, nearly 20 percent of the rural households

over time, while applied methods involve a point-

are expected to be negatively affected by DR-CAFTA

in-time, Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) (Botero

related price changes, while nearly a quarter of ru-

– Lopez, 2004) and static application of AGE model

ral households are expected to experience adverse

of world trade and economic activity known as the

impacts in Guatemala. In El Salvador, the eviden-

Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model (Derosa

ce suggests that those losses among net producing

– Gilbert, 2006).
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At the outset, it should be understood that the econo-

The AGE model analysis suggests that the potential

mic prospects of the United States and Colombia un-

benefits to Colombia of the proposed FTA hinge im-

der a bilateral FTA are not easily assessed with pre-

portantly on how widely the United States pursues

cision because of the numerous factors underlying

similar FTAs with other countries. The United States

the two nations economic and political relations vis-

gains from establishing numerous FTAs, gradually co-

à-vis not only one another but also other prominent

vering a substantial proportion of its trade with the

trading partners. Given the AGE model’s extensive

world. At the same time, however, the potential gains

coverage of economic variables, the applied analysis

to Colombia and other US FTA partners decline.

presented here does, however, succeed in providing
a fairly in-depth view of the potential impact of the

Results of the AGE Model (Botero – Lopez, 2005)

proposed FTA.

shows that in each sub-sector GDP growths, the higher results are for industrial sector, the lower for mining (See Chart 5).
Chart 5. Impacts

of

FTA

in

Sub-sector GDP

6.00%
4.93%

5.00%

4.34%

4.00%
3.19%
3.00%
2.01%

2.00%

1.48%

1.00%
0.00%
Agricultural

Mining

Industrial

Services

Average GDP

Source: Author based on Botero – López, 2005.

Chart 6 presents the effects of FTA simulated by the

employment and, only very small changes in other

GTAP model on employment in absolute values.

values, it is important to underline that informal em-

Examining the changes in employment values, the

ployment also increases.

largest changes tend to be observed in unskilled
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Chart 6. Static Comparative: Impact

on

Employment
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Source: Author based on Botero – Lopez, 2005.

Chart 7 presents the estimated sectoral impacts of a

given the small size of the Colombian economy and

US-Colombia FTA in terms of the percentage change

the importance of the US market. The largest export

in the value of exports (evaluated at world prices)

increases are in textiles and wearing apparel, other

relative to the baseline. Both the percentage change

crops, food products and services. Export declines

in total export value and the percentage change in

are seen in grains, other agriculture, and other ma-

the value of exports to the FTA partner are presented

nufacture and heavy industry. Chart 8 shows the

in the scenarios (short and long term). For Colombia,

sub-sector impacts for agriculture, gives indications

the overall effects are more significant, as expected,

of which sub-sectors are likely to gain or lose from
preferential market access.

Chart 7. Impacts

of

FTA

in different sectors

13.2
12.5

Textiles and Wearing
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-0.1
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Source: Author based on Echavarría, 2006.
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Chart 8. Agricultural Sub-sectors Impact
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Source: Author based on Echavarría, 2006.

Table 4. Estimated Direct Impacts

Rice

of

FTA

by

Product

Producer
Price

Producer’s
Gross Income

Profits (% of
PGI)

Crops
Area

Employment

Wages

-17,9%

-31,6%

-18,0%

-16,9%

-16,9%

-16,9%

Corn

-32,1%

-42,8%

-29,6%

-17,8%

-17,8%

-17,8%

Sorgo

-18,7%

-34,2%

-16,9%

-17,8%

-17,8%

-17,8%

Wheat

-25,8%

-62,6%

-19,0%

-77,6%

-77,6%

-77,6%

Soja

-15,5%

-39,9%

-13,2%

-30,6%

-30,6%

-30,6%

Cotton

-5,1%

-9,8%

-5,0%

-8,1%

-8,1%

-8,1%

Beans

-25,0%

-43,2%

-22,0%

-13,8%

-13,8%

-13,8%

Veg. Oil

-18,5%

-36,3%

-16,5%

-37,0%

-37,0%

-37,0%

Chicken
Meat

-49,1%

-100,0%

-31,1%

n.a.

-100,0%

-100,0%

Source: Garay, 2004.

As shown in table 4, producer’s gross income (that

unemployed workers would stop perceiving, until

is supposed similar to the value of the production)

they be absorbed by the export activities.

of the nine considered products, would decrease in
57% (in constant pesos of the year 2002). This is an

Crops area, without poultry keeping, would decrease

indicator of the fall in the general economic activity

in 20%. Supposing fixed coefficients of employment

in such products. The loss of surpluses of the pro-

for hectare and constant wages, the employment and

ducers would be equal to 22% of the initial gross en-

the labor revenues would descend in 35%. Most of

trance or 39% of the loss of gross revenues. Since

the losses of revenues and employments would ha-

they are only considering reduction effects, to this

ppen in the poultry sector and in the productions of

loss it is necessary to add the labor revenues that

rice, corn and raw palm oil.
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Latin

FTAs

and
migration

Do trade barrier reduction stimulate a bigger econo-

Finally, as exposed below, the negative economic im-

and subsequent economic growth (See Chart 9). The

american

pact of revised FTAs (NAFTA, DR-CAFTA and USColombia) is addressed to the most sensitive agricultural sectors and will impact on the wages of many
workers. Low incomes create an incentive for people
to emigrate, but paradoxically, there are many cases
where both incomes and international migration are
increasing in poor regions of revised countries. Migration may increase in the short run if trade reforms
spur imports that compete with labor-intensive production. In the long run, if export activities expand
and remittances create income and investment mul-

mic progress? available studies don’t reveal any systematic relationship among tariffs, non tariff barriers
only clear model is that countries lower their restrictions to trade when they are rich and stable. This
discovery explains why rich countries today, with
few exceptions, have achieved its modern economic
growth behind protection barriers, but now they deploy (selective) barriers to trade drops.
The evidence in the benefits of liberalizing the investment flows is even weaker. In theory, the relationship seems obvious: If the capital is free to enter
(and to leave) markets, based on the potential return

tipliers, migration pressures may subside.

of the investment, the result will be an effective as-

Usually it is not the poorest households that send

markets are inherently unstable, subject to bubbles

signment of global resources. But in reality, financial

migrants abroad. The poorest households have an incentive to send migrants abroad and reap the reward
of remittance income that is higher than what family
members could earn at home. However, international migration is costly and risky, and the poorest
households often cannot afford the costs and risks.
At the other extreme, relatively well-off households
in poor regions have the liquidity to pay the international migration bill and are often more willing
to assume risks (or else have ways to insure themselves against risks). However, while they are more
likely to have the means to migrate abroad, they are
less likely to have the will. As a result, in poor areas
of Latin America Countries, international migrants
tend to come from the upper-middle part of the income distribution, not from the poorest households.
This raises some questions about the effectiveness of
remittances at reducing poverty.

(rational or not) and panic crises. There is enough
evidence that financial liberalization is followed by
financial crisis, such is the case of Mexico, Thailand,
or Turkey; whereas evidence of growth due to the liberalization of the investment flows is quite scarce.
Liberalization could reduce the differences of wages
in the way that productive sectors are guided to comparative advantage of the country and would have
a positive effect in the reduction of poverty. On the
other hand, negative effects could enlarge the breach in wages. Liberalization brings cheaper capital
goods, causing managers to replace manpower for
machinery, generating negative impact on wages and
stimulating unemployment. But, being the skilled
manpower a complement to the physical capital, the
demand for this type of workers will generate a bigger breach among skilled and unskilled workers.

Free Trade Agreements and their impact on Latin American migrations: An approach / 21

Revista Equidad y Desarrollo Nº 10 / Julio - diciembre de 2008

Chart 9. Evolution GDP, Exports, Poverty

and

Migration Latin America Averages
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Source: Author based on series from CepalStat, CEPAL 2007 and Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision.

Conclusions

gional) it increases it and causes a major determinant of international migration from Latin Ame-

This brief approach of trends and impacts of FTAs

rican countries.

and international migration leads to the following
conclusions:

These findings point to a rich set of potential policy implications. Increased mobility is a concomi-

• Underdevelopment drives migration, but migration also affects Underdevelopment.

tant part of economic success: as per capita incomes
grow, people leave the agricultural sector (they also

• Income gaps between rich and poor countries

move out of rural areas). This does not mean that

create the incentives for international migration

governments should be passive or not try to promote

but they are a necessary—not a sufficient— con-

development in migrant-sending areas, for at least

dition. Most people do not migrate, even when

two reasons.

incomes are far higher abroad than at home.
• Income growth in migrant-sending areas is often

First, when low incomes are compounded by poor

associated with more international migration, not

access to markets for inputs, outputs, credit, and in-

less. In all countries that experience rapid inco-

surance, there may be too much migration. Second,

me growth, the share of people in farm jobs and

many of the world’s migrants come from rural areas,

in rural areas goes down.

and it is now well known that in countries where

• Data demonstrate that opening an economy to

agriculture is not growing, the rest of the economy

free trade doesn’t reduce poverty automatically;

usually does badly, too. However, occupational mi-

on the contrary, in some cases (regional or subre-

gration away from farm jobs and geographic migra-
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tion from rural areas, if anything, are likely to be hig-

countries to create an environment that is conducive

her when incomes are growing.

to broad-based economic growth can generally shape
the economic landscape in migrant-sending areas,

The challenge for policymakers is to make migration

the contributions of migration to development, and

a development tool and part of a dynamic process of

the nonmigration options available to those who stay

income growth instead of a response to limited op-

behind.

portunities in migrant-sending areas. The ability of
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